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EXPLOITATION AND RESISTANCE:
HOW OLD PROBLEMS CHANGE OVER TIME
Jennifer Hochschild*
Aziz RANA, THE Two FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (Harvard Univ. Press 2010).
Pp. 432. Hardcover. $29.95.
TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (Oxford Univ. Press 2011). Pp. 608.

Hardcover. $34.95.
It is not obvious at first glance (or second or third) why these two books should be
reviewed together. The Two Faces of American Freedom (hereafter, Two Faces) is a
broad, sweeping history of Americans' views and actions with regard to freedom and
imperialism from the seventeenth through the twentieth centuries. It focuses largely,
though not entirely, on political philosophies, legal decisions, mentalitis, and belief
systems. It is a work of "social criticism, in which history is presented in the service of
today's problems as well as tomorrow's latent possibilities." In the best tradition of the
American jeremiad, it is largely an argument about decline and fall; starting from a notfully-admirable position with regard to freedom and the settler mentality, "the United
States' orientation to the world [now] combines some of the most problematic
ideological features of the settler past without its emancipatory aspirations."2 Two Faces
focuses on the views and actions of the dominant population, examining non-whites and
non-settlers (and women) only from the vantage point of white settlers and their
descendants.
In contrast, Courage to Dissent is a local history, covering a few decades of one
group in one city. It focuses on the actions and speeches of its protagonists, spending
relatively little time on broad philosophical, legal, or political trends in the society at
large. It "tells [a] story," seeking to bring particular forces "into clearer focus," with the
aim of "bridg[ing] legal and social history, and national and local history." 3 It includes
no overt social criticism. Courage to Dissent is not a history of decline; on balance, black
Atlantans, or at least many of them, are better off at the end of the narrative than they
were at the beginning. Finally, Courage to Dissent pays almost no attention to the
dominant population except insofar as they impinge on blacks in Atlanta; it focuses
* Department of Government, Harvard University.
1. AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 17 (2010).
2. Id. at 329.
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RIGHTS MOVEMENT 7-9 (2011).
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tightly on African American civil rights activists, broadly defined.
Nevertheless, the two books have important similarities beyond the fact that they
are both histories written by law professors. I will first describe the books, then address a
set of questions that both raise and that neither satisfactorily answers. That is not a
criticism; it is a token of the significance and difficulty of the issues they point us
toward.
Two Faces revolves around a paradox that arose soon after Europeans settled the
purportedly New World and that has persisted, in various incarnations, ever since. The
paradox centers on the relationship between freedom and domination; is it possible for a
large group of people to be politically, economically, morally, and behaviorally free
without imposing control over, or even engaging in genocide against, other groups of
people? More simply, can republican freedom persist without being embedded in a
settler or colonial society? And if they do coincide, must the imperatives of control
dominate opportunities for individual or collective freedom?
Rana develops answers to these questions through a series of dense but well
controlled chapters focusing sequentially on colonists' relations with England prior to
and during the American Revolution, the rise and distortion of Jacksonian populism, the
resurgence of populism in the Gilded Age, the transformations of Progressivism and the
New Deal, and more briefly, the contemporary political scene. One cannot really
summarize his complex and subtle arguments briefly, but I can perhaps convey their
flavor while urging readers to engage with the book itself.
During the early colonial period, Rana tells us, England treated colonists more like
the Irish and Native Americans than like Englishmen - that is, almost as slaves and
certainly as second-class citizens. The settlers, however, eventually asserted their rights
as Englishmen, while "reinforcing the dichotomy between friend and enemy, between
those included as free citizens and those excluded as threats to settler freedom."4 The
growing British empire's effort to treat all subjects - white Americans, nonwhite
Americans, and nonwhites around the world - similarly became unacceptable to the
Americans, who had been developing "a remarkably robust account of freedom, one that
saw self-rule as requiring economic, political, and spiritual independence." 5 Hence,
revolution.
During the period of Constitutional framing, western farmers further developed a
robust sense of republican freedom. Westerners claimed "an identity between the
common good and the interests ... of the laboring community" and required that
governments be "local producerist democracies" run by energetic and accountable
legislatures.6 However, over the first few decades of the nineteenth century, "this
populist account of empire and freedom ...

slipped into ...

xenophobia and anti-

govermentalism." 7 That distortion occurred because of rulers' perceived need for a
strong central government to protect the nation against the political powers of England
and France, and because of the economic forces of international mercantilism. "Coastal

4.
5.
6.
7.

RANA, supra note 1, at 22.

Id.
Id. at 102.
Id.
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elites" took political control, reducing republican populists to "policing state activity."8
At the same time, the construction of an external empire "became synonymous with the
internal application of a coercive authority properly applied only to those outside the
bounds of social inclusion, such as natives and blacks." 9
And so it went. A robust, egalitarian, democratic form of republican populism reemerged after the Civil War, only to be distorted once again into racism and hostility to
Indians under the pressure of settlers' desire for western lands and an "external imperial
prerogative." 10 And once again, elite politicians and corporate leaders responded to
populist claims by asserting national authority, both political and economic. By the turn
of the twentieth century, the United States was becoming more bureaucratic, less sharply
distinguished "between free citizen and stratified subject" (at least for white immigrants),
and yet further removed from "the emancipatory promise implicit in settler society."I1
The twentieth century was even worse; by now, politics "deemphasized the very
ideal of freedom as self-rule - reducing it from a central role in collective discourse to a
voice of increasingly isolated dissent."l2 Stratification rose: Asians were forbidden to
immigrate; even white immigrants were treated as outsiders, at least until naturalization;
Indians were stripped of their land; women were admitted to only a thin and largely
meaningless enfranchisement. More broadly, "full membership in the community lost its
ethical basis in either economic independence or democratic self government" while
elites promoted American assertiveness around the world, "imagining that this power
could provide Americans with a sense of shared purpose and collective meaning." 13 The
search for security replaced "participatory control" as "society's guiding commitment,"
to the cost of people and countries outside as well as within American borders. 14
And that, roughly, is where the United States now rests: "plebiscitary politics takes
place against a backdrop in which basic decision making is ... centralized at the top in
state and corporate entities, with most Americans enjoying few of the practical
experiences that were meant to mark free citizenship." 15 Despite this dour conclusion,
Rana wants to end on an optimistic note, so he turns to the 1960s civil rights movement
as a model for reinvigorating a commitment to republican freedom without the
distortions and harms of imperialist land-grabs and subordination of some members of
the polity. He reminds readers that civil rights activists in the 1960s endorsed not only
racial equality but also class equality and an end to American imperialist adventures
abroad. "The concerted activity of men and women deemed unfit" - that is, African
Americans, new immigrants, and feminists - could once again lead to "the revival of
emancipatory ambitions." 1 6
Two Faces is powerful, provocative, deeply researched, and sometimes irritating.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 103.
Id. at 104.
Id. at178.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 326.
Id. at 348.
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What Rana calls "social criticism" in the service of "tomorrow's latent possibilities" has
a whiff of law office history.17 That is not quite fair to this book; Rana is a much better
historian than that pejorative phrase implies. However, he does emphasize some features
of American history while ignoring others. To cite a few examples: Rana does not
discuss northern states' (slow and halting) abolition of slavery around the time of the
Revolution, or efforts at the same time by some southern states to find ways to reduce or
eliminate enslavement. He discusses Thomas Jefferson's philosophy of minimal central
government but not his presidency, which considerably expanded the central
government's power. He tends to treat incorporation of European immigrants as a fairly
smooth, foreordained, uncontested process ("immigrants have gone from being the
engine of settler expansion and thus worthy of full incorporation to . . . dependent

labor"), underplaying the intense hostility to Catholics, the denigration of Eastern and
Southern European immigrants, and the draconian 1924 immigration law that prohibited
most white Europeans from moving to the United States.18 Rana also ignores the fact
that until a few decades ago, isolationism was the province of the right, while
intervention in other states' affairs in order to promote a set of values was the province
of the left. It was liberals who felt the necessity of becoming involved in European
battles in 1940, and conservatives who wanted nothing to do with foreign affairs. So this
book needs to be weighed against other histories of American political development,
both to correct its flaws and to show off its insights.
In contrast to Two Faces, Brown-Nagin's Courageto Dissent pays little attention
to the settlers and focuses almost entirely on one subordinated group - black political
activists in Atlanta, Georgia. The tension driving its narrative arc is not between two
powerful normative ideals uneasily yoked together, but rather among strategies and
tactics all aimed at pursuing the same ideal, racial equality and justice.
Brown-Nagin seeks to show how "local black community members acted as agents
of change -

law shapers, law interpreters, and even law makers.

. .

. This bottom-up

narrative makes intraracial conflict central to the legal history of the civil rights
movement."19 Her first period is that of "pragmatic civil rights lawyering" in the decades
after World War II; it focuses on A.T. Walden. The attorneys leading Atlanta's civil
rights community were committed to racial justice. They were also committed to slow,
careful negotiations with powerful whites so as to preserve whatever status Atlanta's
black elites had acquired, and to enable more blacks to attain "political influence . . . and
. . . personal autonomy."20 Pragmatic lawyering "privileged politics over litigation,
placed a high value on economic security, and rejected the idea that integration (or even
desegregation) and equality were one and the same."21 Walden and his allies negotiated
tenaciously but carefully for voting rights and the right to practice law on equal terms
with white litigators (as well as access to a golf course); they also gingerly took on the
questions of segregated housing, schools, and public facilities. Brown-Nagin concludes

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 17.
Id. at 342-43.
BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 3, at 7-8.
Id. at 2.
Id.
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in this section that, even though Walden and his associates achieved "measurable
improvements" in a few arenas, "Atlanta's white elites ceded very little ground.".22
By the early 1960s, two different groups had pushed aside pragmatic lawyering in
favor of "legal liberalism" through litigation by the NAACP and LDF, and direct action
by college students. Although both groups agreed that Walden's strategy of elite
negotiation was insufficient - some students called him an Uncle Tom - they
disagreed on what should be done instead. The litigators sought to follow the dictates of
the national NAACP in pursuing school and housing desegregation as the path to racial
justice and equality. But for the students, "the NAACP's litigation campaign had a
negative, rather than a positive or inspirational, relationship to the civil rights
movement;"23 they promoted sit-ins and disruption of politics as usual. Brown-Nagin
traces the complicated three-way dance among the pragmatic elite negotiators, the
intense but cautious litigators, and the passionate but inexperienced students. Sometimes
the groups worked together to their mutual benefit; sometimes they fought each other to
a standstill; and eventually the maturing student movement developed a fairly radical
strategy of "movement lawyering."
The history took a fascinating turn in the 1970s. A set of poor black mothers in
Atlanta's ghetto accused the leaders of the former student movement of being cautious
and complacent, just as the latter had accused the pragmatic lawyers a decade earlier.
The issue of class came to the fore. Movement lawyers turned out to be primarily
committed to protecting the jobs of black middle class teachers and school personnel
through a strategy of negotiating for black-controlled schools rather than desegregation.
The welfare rights activists, in contrast, were primarily committed to improving the
quality of schooling for deeply poor children. They believed this goal was more
attainable through desegregation than through black-controlled separate schools. By
1980, when Courage to Dissent ends, the advocates for the poor had mostly lost; their
white lawyer, Margie Hames, took the loss "hard; [s]he knew it hadn't happened to her,
it had happened to the children." 24
Like Rana, Brown-Nagin wants to end on an upbeat note, and the effort to do so is
less jarring in her case given that the book eschews the tone of a jeremiad. Courage to
Dissent maintains that all of the quarreling actors had plausible reasons for their choices,
and that dissent within the black community is to be admired rather than deplored; "[t]he
gift they pass to the present generation is not a doctrinaire set of goals or methods but the
tradition of protest itself, the will to object to injustice, in some way." 25 That slightly
bland conclusion may seem thin gruel to those who prefer Rana's more insistent critique.
But it is sharpened by another of Brown-Nagin's summary observations: her analysis
"has revealed a remarkable point of convergence among lawyers and activists for racial
change. They seldom gave high priority to the concerns of the black working class." 26
That conclusion sits ill with the former one, but it is in my view more powerful, even if

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 128-29.
Id at 134.
Id at 426 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 432.
Id at 434.
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not upbeat.
Courage to Dissent lacks the occasional tendentiousness of Two Faces, but it does
share an irritating flaw. Both authors, especially Brown-Nagin, apparently believe that
they must diminish the work of predecessors in order to enhance the significance of their
own book. Earlier work on similar subjects is described repeatedly as shallow, wrongly
focused, too celebratory, too narrow, or inadequate in some other way. In such mature
works of scholarship, this tendency to set up straw men in order to knock them down is
not only annoying but also unnecessary. These books stand on their own, even if earlier
works are just as good.
I have described these books in some detail for two reasons. First, they both make
rich, complex, subtle arguments that are well-grounded in research and will reward
careful reading. Second, the set of questions that they raise when placed in conjunction
with one another are only intelligible if one has a good idea of what each author is
arguing.
The first and perhaps most urgent question that Two Faces and Courageto Dissent
point us toward is whether it is possible to promote a robust practice of freedom and
democracy for some without also promoting or permitting the exploitation of others.
That is Rana's central theme, and it emerges with increasing force as Brown-Nagin's
narrative develops. It is not a new question; the superb historian Edmund Morgan
developed it in American Slavery, American Freedom,27 and I followed his lead in my
own work on The New American Dilemma: Liberal Democracy and School
Desegregation.28However, each book explores it with integrity and insight. The force of
Rana's analysis is that, at least in the history of the United States, exploitation not only
goes hand in hand with republican freedom but also trumps it. The force of BrownNagin's analysis is that even those with the strongest commitments to justice and
equality end up chiefly promoting their own interests and the interests of people like
them; inadvertence may not feel very different from exploitation if one lives in a ghetto
with no chance of mobility.
A second theme of both books is generational change. This too is not a new point,
nor do the authors claim that it is, but again both books contribute effectively to an old
stream of research. Courage to Dissent is largely structured around the theme of almost
Oedipal succession. At intervals of roughly a decade apart, a new set of civil rights
activists scorns the choices of the previous set, only to be scorned in turn when they have
fought their way to prominence. Nonetheless, no generation completely replaces the
choices of its predecessors, so the array of potential strategies for activism expands over
time. Some later generations are more effective than earlier ones in promoting racial
freedom and justice, but one cannot claim that wisdom or generosity of spirit also
expands over time. Two Faces pays less attention to explicit generational challenges,
although Rana shows how actors sometimes react against paths laid out by their
predecessors. In his book, wisdom and generosity of spirit are on a downhill slide; he
never fully explains how the early Americans were able to develop a robust sense of

27. EDMUND MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM (1975).
28. JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
DESEGREGATION (1984).
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republican freedom, given how readily their successors succumbed to distorting and
narrowing the views they inherited. A third question is related to the second: over
decades or centuries, has the United States become less racially hierarchical, or more
racially fair, than at some earlier point? I think Brown-Nagin would say yes; even though
the working class and poor never receive their due, the black Atlanta population as a
whole is better off in 1980 than it was in 1945. Does that imply that generations are in
fact successively more wise or generous of spirit, or that Americans may figure out how
to promote freedom and democracy without having to exploit others or deny them
freedom and democracy? Since these are my questions and not Brown-Nagin's, she does
not answer them. It is less clear that Rana believes the United States to have become less
hierarchical and more fair over time. He points to the indisputable facts that women
gained the franchise, white immigrants were incorporated, blacks were freed from
enslavement, and colonies such as the Philippines were given up. But, in an eerie and
perhaps unintentional echo of de Tocqueville's marvelous passage about a nation of
sheep with a governmental shepherd, he also concludes that Americans have abandoned
republican self-government and public engagement in favor of security. Non-white
immigrants have become a new source of dependent and unfree labor, and perhaps the
cycle of settler exploitation is beginning again.
Whatever is happening to American exploitation and freedom, these books are
evidence that something good is happening in law schools and history departments.
Seldom is a scholar's first book as important and compelling as these two are; I look
forward to reading whatever they produce in the future.
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